On the Role of Incentives in Evolutionary Approaches to Organizational Design
This paper introduces a model of a stylized organization that is comprised of several departments that autonomously allocate tasks. To do so, the departments either take short-sighted decisions that immediately maximize their utility or take long-sighted decisions that aim at minimizing the interdependencies between tasks. The organization guides the departments' behavior by either an individualistic, a balanced, or an altruistic linear incentive scheme. Even if tasks are perfectly decomposable, altruistic incentive schemes are preferred over individualistic incentive schemes since they substantially increase the organization's performance. Interestingly, if altruistic incentive schemes are effective, short-sighted decisions appear favorable since they do not only increase performance in the short run but also result in significantly higher performances in the long run.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Designing organizations for bottom-up task allocation: The role of incentives
In recent years, various decentralized organizational forms have emerged, posing a challenge for organizational design. Some design elements, such as task allocation, become emergent properties that cannot be fully contr…
Both eyes open: Vigilant Incentives help Regulatory Markets improve AI Safety
In the context of rapid discoveries by leaders in AI, governments must consider how to design regulation that matches the increasing pace of new AI capabilities. Regulatory Markets for AI is a proposal designed with adap…
Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the Workplace
We analyze how firms should design wage contracts when workers collaborate in teams and effort costs depend on colleagues through a peer network. Performance-based compensation generates incentives that cascade through t…
Organizational Bulk Email Systems: Their Role and Performance in Remote Work
The COVID-19 pandemic has forced many employees to work from home. Organizational bulk emails now play a critical role to reach employees with central information in this work-from-home environment. However, we know from…
PositionIncentive Design with Spillovers
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimiza…