One Pic is All it Takes: Poisoning Visual Document Retrieval Augmented Generation with a Single Image
Multi-modal retrieval augmented generation (M-RAG) is instrumental for inhibiting hallucinations in large multi-modal models (LMMs) through the use of a factual knowledge base (KB). However, M-RAG introduces new attack vectors for adversaries that aim to disrupt the system by injecting malicious entries into the KB. In this paper, we present the first poisoning attack against M-RAG targeting visual document retrieval applications where the KB contains images of document pages. We propose two attacks, each of which require injecting only a single adversarial image into the KB. Firstly, we propose a universal attack that, for any potential user query, influences the response to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) in the M-RAG system. Secondly, we present a targeted attack against one or a group of user queries, with the goal of spreading targeted misinformation. For both attacks, we use a multi-objective gradient-based adversarial approach to craft the injected image while optimizing for both retrieval and generation. We evaluate our attacks against several visual document retrieval datasets, a diverse set of state-of-the-art retrievers (embedding models) and generators (LMMs), demonstrating the attack effectiveness in both the universal and targeted settings. We additionally present results including commonly used defenses, various attack hyper-parameter settings, ablations, and attack transferability.
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AllMisinformationRAGRetrievalRetrieval-augmented GenerationMethods 이 논문이 사용한 방법론
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