Optimal Investment and Fair Sharing Rules of the Incentives for Renewable Energy Communities
The focus on Renewable Energy Communities (REC) is fastly growing after the European Union (EU) has introduced a dedicated regulation in 2018. The idea of creating local groups of citizens, small- and medium-sized companies, and public institutions, which self-produce and self-consume energy from renewable sources is at the same time a way to save money for the participants, increase efficiency of the energy system, and reduce CO$_2$ emissions. Member states inside the EU are fixing more detailed regulations, which describe, how public incentives are measured. A natural objective for the incentive policies is of course to promote the self-consumption of a REC. A sophisticated incentive policy is that based on the so called 'virtual framework'. Under this framework all the energy produced by a REC is sold to the market, and all the energy consumed must be paid to retailers: self-consumption occurs only 'virtually', thanks a money compensation (paid by a central authority) for every MWh produced and consumed by the REC in the same hour. In this context, two problems have to be solved: the optimal investment in new technologies and a fair division of the incentive among the community members. We address these problems by considering a particular type of REC, composed by a representative household and a biogas producer, where the potential demand of the community is given by the household's demand, while both members produce renewable energy. We set the problem as a leader-follower problem: the leader decide how to share the incentive for the self-consumed energy, while the followers decide their own optimal installation strategy. We solve the leader's problem by searching for a Nash bargaining solution for the incentive's fair division, while the follower problem is solved by finding the Nash equilibria of a static competitive game between the members.
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