PAC Reinforcement Learning Algorithm for General-Sum Markov Games
This paper presents a theoretical framework for probably approximately correct (PAC) multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms for Markov games. The paper offers an extension to the well-known Nash Q-learning algorithm, using the idea of delayed Q-learning, in order to build a new PAC MARL algorithm for general-sum Markov games. In addition to guiding the design of a provably PAC MARL algorithm, the framework enables checking whether an arbitrary MARL algorithm is PAC. Comparative numerical results demonstrate performance and robustness.
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Multi-agent Reinforcement LearningQ-Learningreinforcement-learningReinforcement LearningReinforcement Learning (RL)Methods 이 논문이 사용한 방법론
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