Population Games With Erlang Clocks: Convergence to Nash Equilibria For Pairwise Comparison Dynamics
The prevailing methodology for analyzing population games and evolutionary dynamics in the large population limit assumes that a Poisson process (or clock) inherent to each agent determines when the agent can revise its strategy. Hence, such an approach presupposes exponentially distributed inter-revision intervals, and is inadequate for cases where each strategy entails a sequence of sub-tasks (sub-strategies) that must be completed before a new revision time occurs. This article proposes a methodology for such cases under the premise that a sub-strategy's duration is exponentially-distributed, leading to Erlang distributed inter-revision intervals. We assume that a so-called pairwise-comparison protocol captures the agents' revision preferences to render our analysis concrete. The presence of sub-strategies brings on additional dynamics that is incompatible with existing models and results. Our main contributions are twofold, both derived for a deterministic approximation valid for large populations. We prove convergence of the population's state to the Nash equilibrium set when a potential game generates a payoff for the strategies. We use system-theoretic passivity to determine conditions under which this convergence is guaranteed for contractive games.
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