Prisoner Dilemma in maximization constrained: the rationality of cooperation
David Gauthier in his article, Maximization constrained: the rationality of cooperation, tries to defend the joint strategy in situations in which no outcome is both equilibrium and optimal. Prisoner Dilemma is the most familiar example of these situations. He first starts with some quotes by Hobbes in Leviathan; Hobbes, in chapter 15 discusses an objection by someone is called Foole, and then will reject his view. In response to Foole, Hobbes presents two strategies (i.e. joint and individual) and two kinds of agents in such problems including Prisoner Dilemma, i.e. straightforward maximizer (SM) and constrained maximizer(CM). Then he considers two arguments respectively for SM and CM, and he will show that why in an ideal and transparent situation, the first argument fails and the second one would be the only valid argument. Likewise, in the following part of his article, he considers more realistic situations with translucency and he concludes that under some conditions, the joint strategy would be still the rational decision.
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