Nightshade: Prompt-Specific Poisoning Attacks on Text-to-Image Generative Models
Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Tasks
Data PoisoningMethods 이 논문이 사용한 방법론
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Understanding Implosion in Text-to-Image Generative Models
Recent works show that text-to-image generative models are surprisingly vulnerable to a variety of poisoning attacks. Empirical results find that these models can be corrupted by altering associations between individual …
Cordyceps: Covert Control Attacks on LLMs via Data Poisoning
Large language models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned on uncurated text datasets that adversaries can poison. Existing poisoning attacks primarily rely on fixed trigger phrases that defenses such as outlier detection, clean-…
Outlier DetectionEnhancing Prompt Injection Attacks to LLMs via Poisoning Alignment
In a prompt injection attack, an attacker injects a prompt into the original one, aiming to make an LLM follow the injected prompt to perform an attacker-chosen task. Existing attacks primarily focus on how to blend the …
From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agents
Memory is a core component of AI agents, enabling them to accumulate knowledge across interactions and improve performance. However, persistent memory introduces the risk of memory poisoning, where a single adversarial m…
MIRROR: Novelty-Constrained Memory-Guided MCTS Red-Teaming for Agentic RAG
Multimodal agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems expand the attack surface beyond prompt injection to include text poisoning, image injection, direct-query attacks, and orchestrator-level tool manipulation…