Quantal Response Equilibrium with a Continuum of Types: Characterization and Nonparametric Identification
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash equilibrium, is a standard benchmark in the analysis of experimental data. Despite its influence, nonparametric characterizations and tests of QRE are unavailable beyond the case of finite games. We address this gap by completely characterizing the set of QRE in a class of binary-action games with a continuum of types. Our characterization provides sharp predictions in settings such as global games, volunteer's dilemma, and the compromise game. Further, we leverage our results to develop nonparametric tests of QRE. As an empirical application, we revisit the experimental data from Carrillo and Palfrey (2009) on the compromise game.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
The Focal Quantal Response Equilibrium
We propose a generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) built on a simple premise: some actions are more focal than others. In our model, which we call the Focal Quantal Response Equilibrium (Focal QRE), each p…
Ultracoarse Equilibria and Ordinal-Folding Dynamics in Operator-Algebraic Models of Infinite Multi-Agent Games
We develop an operator algebraic framework for infinite games with a continuum of agents and prove that regret based learning dynamics governed by a noncommutative continuity equation converge to a unique quantal respons…
From Behavioral Theories to Econometrics: Inferring Preferences of Human Agents from Data on Repeated Interactions
We consider the problem of estimating preferences of human agents from data of strategic systems where the agents repeatedly interact. Recently, it was demonstrated that a new estimation method called "quantal regret" pr…
EconometricsActions Speak What You Want: Provably Sample-Efficient Reinforcement Learning of the Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium from Strategic Feedbacks
We study reinforcement learning (RL) for learning a Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium (QSE) in an episodic Markov game with a leader-follower structure. In specific, at the outset of the game, the leader announces her poli…
Decision MakingLEMMAReinforcement Learning (RL)Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: The Quantal Hierarchy model of decision-making
While game theory has been transformative for decision-making, the assumptions made can be overly restrictive in certain instances. In this work, we investigate some of the underlying assumptions of rationality, such as …
Decision MakingSequential Decision Making