Dynamic Matching Bandit For Two-Sided Online Markets
Two-sided online matching platforms are employed in various markets. However, agents' preferences in the current market are usually implicit and unknown, thus needing to be learned from data. With the growing availability of dynamic side information involved in the decision process, modern online matching methodology demands the capability to track shifting preferences for agents based on contextual information. This motivates us to propose a novel framework for this dynamic online matching problem with contextual information, which allows for dynamic preferences in matching decisions. Existing works focus on online matching with static preferences, but this is insufficient: the two-sided preference changes as soon as one side's contextual information updates, resulting in non-static matching. In this paper, we propose a dynamic matching bandit algorithm to adapt to this problem. The key component of the proposed dynamic matching algorithm is an online estimation of the preference ranking with a statistical guarantee. Theoretically, we show that the proposed dynamic matching algorithm delivers an agent-optimal stable matching result with high probability. In particular, we prove a logarithmic regret upper bound $\mathcal{O}(\log(T))$ and construct a corresponding instance-dependent matching regret lower bound. In the experiments, we demonstrate that dynamic matching algorithm is robust to various preference schemes, dimensions of contexts, reward noise levels, and context variation levels, and its application to a job-seeking market further demonstrates the practical usage of the proposed method.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Bandit based centralized matching in two-sided markets for peer to peer lending
Sequential fundraising in two sided online platforms enable peer to peer lending by sequentially bringing potential contributors, each of whose decisions impact other contributors in the market. However, understanding th…
Decision MakingSequential Decision MakingProbably Correct Optimal Stable Matching for Two-Sided Markets Under Uncertainty
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, an…
Decentralized Competing Bandits in Non-Stationary Matching Markets
Understanding complex dynamics of two-sided online matching markets, where the demand-side agents compete to match with the supply-side (arms), has recently received substantial interest. To that end, in this paper, we i…
Competing Bandits in Matching Markets
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matc…
Multi-Armed BanditsLearn to Match: Two-Sided Matching with Temporally Extended Feedback
Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation. Existing matching models typically reduce this process to immediate sub-Gaus…
Decision Making