Reducing Exploitability with Population Based Training
Self-play reinforcement learning has achieved state-of-the-art, and often superhuman, performance in a variety of zero-sum games. Yet prior work has found that policies that are highly capable against regular opponents can fail catastrophically against adversarial policies: an opponent trained explicitly against the victim. Prior defenses using adversarial training were able to make the victim robust to a specific adversary, but the victim remained vulnerable to new ones. We conjecture this limitation was due to insufficient diversity of adversaries seen during training. We analyze a defense using population based training to pit the victim against a diverse set of opponents. We evaluate this defense's robustness against new adversaries in two low-dimensional environments. This defense increases robustness against adversaries, as measured by the number of attacker training timesteps to exploit the victim. Furthermore, we show that robustness is correlated with the size of the opponent population.
Code (1)
Tasks
DiversityMethods 이 논문이 사용한 방법론
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
A Game-Theoretic Approach for Improving Generalization Ability of TSP Solvers
In this paper, we introduce a two-player zero-sum framework between a trainable \emph{Solver} and a \emph{Data Generator} to improve the generalization ability of deep learning-based solvers for Traveling Salesman Proble…
Traveling Salesman ProblemGlobal Policy-Space Response Oracles for Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
The Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) framework scales equilibrium computation to large zero-sum games by iteratively expanding a restricted strategy set using deep reinforcement learning (DRL). A central challenge is…
Reinforcement LearningPopulation-Aware Imitation Learning in Mean-field Games with Common Noise
Mean Field Games (MFGs) provide a powerful framework for modeling the collective behavior of large populations of interacting agents. In this paper, we address the problem of Imitation Learning (IL) in MFGs subject to co…
ApproxED: Approximate exploitability descent via learned best responses
There has been substantial progress on finding game-theoretic equilibria. Most of that work has focused on games with finite, discrete action spaces. However, many games involving space, time, money, and other fine-grain…
Fusion-PSRO: Nash Policy Fusion for Policy Space Response Oracles
For solving zero-sum games involving non-transitivity, a useful approach is to maintain a policy population to approximate the Nash Equilibrium (NE). Previous studies have shown that the Policy Space Response Oracles (PS…
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning