Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk
An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new (stochastically independent) decision problems. They have a conflict of interest over which action should be implemented at least in some cases. Our main result is that, while the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame perfect equilibrium (by force of the usual folk theorem), no payoff profile close to the Decision-Maker's optimal one is immune to renegotiation. Pareto efficient renegotiation-proof equilibria are typically attainable, and they entail a compromise between the Advisor and the Decision-Maker. This could take the form of the Advisor being truthful and the Decision-Maker not utilizing this information to their own full advantage, or the Advisor being somewhat liberal with the truth and the Decision-Maker, while fully aware of this, pretending to believe the Advisor.
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