Repeated Auctions with Speculators: Arbitrage Incentives and Forks in DAOs
We analyze the vulnerability of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) to speculative exploitation via their redemption mechanisms. Studying a game-theoretic model of repeated auctions for governance shares with speculators, we characterize the conditions under which -- in equilibrium -- an exploitative exit is guaranteed to occur, occurs in expectation, or never occurs. We evaluate four redemption mechanisms and extend our model to include atomic exits, time delays, and DAO spending strategies. Our results highlight an inherent tension in DAO design: mechanisms intended to protect members from majority attacks can inadvertently create opportunities for costly speculative exploitation. We highlight governance mechanisms that can be used to prevent speculation.
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