Robust Equilibria in Generic Extensive form Games
We prove the 2-player, generic extensive-form case of the conjecture of Govindan and Wilson (1997a,b) and Hauk and Hurkens (2002) stating that an equilibrium component is essential in every equivalent game if and only if the index of the component is nonzero. This provides an index-theoretic characterization of the concept of hyperstable components of equilibria in generic extensive-form games, first formulated by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). We also illustrate how to compute hyperstable equilibria in multiple economically relevant examples and show how the predictions of hyperstability compare with other solution concepts.
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