홈 › Papers

Same Model, Different Weakness: How Language and Modality Reshape the Jailbreak Attack Surface in Frontier MLLMs

The attack surface of a multimodal large language model (MLLM) is language-dependent in ways that reveal the mechanistic structure of alignment failures. We present the first systematic cross-lingual, multimodal red-teaming study comparing jailbreak vulnerability in US English (en-US) and Mexican Spanish (es-MX) across four frontier MLLMs: Claude Sonnet 4.5, GPT-5, Pixtral Large, and Qwen Omni. Using a fixed adversarial benchmark of 363 diverse prompt scenarios administered in text-only and multimodal conditions, we collected 52,272 harm ratings and binary attack success judgements from matched panels of nine native-speaker annotators per language group. Our central finding is that language does not scale vulnerability uniformly. Bayesian mixed-effects analyses reveal that linguistic framing attacks such as role-play become substantially less effective under Spanish prompting, while visually explicit multimodal attacks become more effective, which directly implicates the prompt-language interface rather than global annotator leniency. This dissociation indicates that linguistic and visual alignment failures operate through distinct mechanisms, and that switching language is sufficient to expose that separation. The practical consequence is that safety rankings are not preserved across languages. Qwen Omni overtakes Pixtral Large as the most vulnerable model among es-MX participants, a rank reversal no scalar correction of English-condition scores could recover, and absolute attack success rates have declined across model generations without closing the gaps between them. These findings demonstrate that safety evaluation frameworks treating language and modality as independent dimensions fundamentally misspecify the attack surface of globally deployed MLLMs, and must be redesigned accordingly.

Code (0)

등록된 구현이 없습니다.

Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반