Sell More, Play Less: Benchmarking LLM Realistic Selling Skill
Sales dialogues require multi-turn, goal-directed persuasion under asymmetric incentives, which makes them a challenging setting for large language models (LLMs). Yet existing dialogue benchmarks rarely measure deal progression and outcomes. We introduce SalesLLM benchmark, a bilingual (ZH/EN) benchmark derived from realistic applications covering Financial Services and Consumer Goods, built from 30,074 scripted configurations and 1,805 curated multi-turn scenarios with controllable difficulty and personas. We propose a fully automatic evaluation pipeline that combines (i) an LLM judge for sales-process progress, and (ii) fine-tuned BERT classifiers for end-of-dialogue buying intent. To improve simulation fidelity, we train a user model, CustomerLM, with SFT and DPO on 8,000+ crowdworker-involved sales conversations, reducing role inversion from 17.44% (GPT-4o) to 8.8%. SalesLLM benchmark scores correlate strongly with human ratings (average Pearson r=0.86; inter-annotator agreement Krippendorff's alpha=0.86, 500 annotations per model). Across 15 mainstream LLMs, in Chinese the strongest models are competitive with typical (junior-to-intermediate) human salespeople -- not with sales experts -- while weaker ones fall below this baseline, and cross-lingual consistency remains poor. SalesLLM benchmark serves as a scalable benchmark for outcome-oriented sales agents. Our code and data are released at https://github.com/Bairong-Xdynamics/Benchmarking-LLM-Realistic-Selling-Skill
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