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Papers

Seq2Seq Mimic Games: A Signaling Perspective

2018-11-15 · Juan Leni, John Levine, John Quigley

We study the emergence of communication in multiagent adversarial settings inspired by the classic Imitation game. A class of three player games is used to explore how agents based on sequence to sequence (Seq2Seq) models can learn to communicate information in adversarial settings. We propose a modeling approach, an initial set of experiments and use signaling theory to support our analysis. In addition, we describe how we operationalize the learning process of actor-critic Seq2Seq based agents in these communicational games.

📄 PDF Abstract BibTeX arXiv:1811.06564

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Methods 이 논문이 사용한 방법론

Sigmoid Activation 설명 없음
Tanh Activation 설명 없음
LSTM An LSTM is a type of recurrent neural network that addresses the vanishing gradient problem in vanilla…
Seq2Seq Seq2Seq, or Sequence To Sequence, is a model used in sequence prediction tasks, such as language modelling and machine translation. The idea is to use one…

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