Sequential Cursed Equilibrium
We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players that neglect information from hypothetical events, but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005), and allows that players can be 'cursed about' endogenous information.
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