paper-with-me

Papers

Solving Common-Payoff Games with Approximate Policy Iteration

2021-01-11 · Samuel Sokota, Edward Lockhart, Finbarr Timbers, Elnaz Davoodi, Ryan D'Orazio, Neil Burch, Martin Schmid, Michael Bowling, Marc Lanctot

For artificially intelligent learning systems to have widespread applicability in real-world settings, it is important that they be able to operate decentrally. Unfortunately, decentralized control is difficult -- computing even an epsilon-optimal joint policy is a NEXP complete problem. Nevertheless, a recently rediscovered insight -- that a team of agents can coordinate via common knowledge -- has given rise to algorithms capable of finding optimal joint policies in small common-payoff games. The Bayesian action decoder (BAD) leverages this insight and deep reinforcement learning to scale to games as large as two-player Hanabi. However, the approximations it uses to do so prevent it from discovering optimal joint policies even in games small enough to brute force optimal solutions. This work proposes CAPI, a novel algorithm which, like BAD, combines common knowledge with deep reinforcement learning. However, unlike BAD, CAPI prioritizes the propensity to discover optimal joint policies over scalability. While this choice precludes CAPI from scaling to games as large as Hanabi, empirical results demonstrate that, on the games to which CAPI does scale, it is capable of discovering optimal joint policies even when other modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms are unable to do so. Code is available at https://github.com/ssokota/capi .

📄 PDF Abstract BibTeX arXiv:2101.04237

Code (2)

ssokota/capi 공식 구현 pytorch
ssokota/tiny-hanabi 공식 구현

Tasks

DecoderDeep Reinforcement LearningMulti-agent Reinforcement Learningreinforcement-learningReinforcement LearningReinforcement Learning (RL)

Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반

Abstracting Imperfect Information Away from Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

2023-01-22 · Samuel Sokota, Ryan D'Orazio, Chun Kai Ling, David J. Wu 외

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound …

Vocal Bursts Valence Prediction

The Power of Perturbation under Sampling in Solving Extensive-Form Games

2025-01-28 · Wataru Masaka, Mitsuki Sakamoto, Kenshi Abe, Kaito Ariu 외

This paper investigates how perturbation does and does not improve the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm in imperfect-information extensive-form games. Perturbing the expected payoffs guarantees that the FTR…

Form

Function Approximation for Solving Stackelberg Equilibrium in Large Perfect Information Games

2022-12-29 · Chun Kai Ling, J. Zico Kolter, Fei Fang

Function approximation (FA) has been a critical component in solving large zero-sum games. Yet, little attention has been given towards FA in solving \textit{general-sum} extensive-form games, despite them being widely r…

Optimal Rates for Feasible Payoff Set Estimation in Games

2026-02-04 · Annalisa Barbara, Riccardo Poiani, Martino Bernasconi, Andrea Celli arxiv

We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A nat…

Actor-Dual-Critic Dynamics for Zero-sum and Identical-Interest Stochastic Games

2026-01-31 · Ahmed Said Donmez, Yuksel Arslantas, Muhammed O. Sayin arxiv

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, w…