Surplus Extraction with Behavioral Types
We examine the surplus extraction problem in a mechanism design setting with behavioral types. In our model behavioral types always perfectly reveal their private information. We characterize the sufficient conditions that guarantee full extraction in a finite version of the reduced form environment of McAfee and Reny (1992). We found that the standard convex independence condition identified in Cremer and McLean (1988) is required only among the beliefs of strategic types, while a weaker condition is required for the beliefs of behavioral types.
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