Swap Regret Minimization Through Response-Based Approachability
We consider the problem of minimizing different notions of swap regret in online optimization. These forms of regret are tightly connected to correlated equilibrium concepts in games, and have been more recently shown to guarantee non-manipulability against strategic adversaries. The only computationally efficient algorithm for minimizing linear swap regret over a general convex set in $\mathbb{R}^d$ was developed recently by Daskalakis, Farina, Fishelson, Pipis, and Schneider (STOC '25). However, it incurs a highly suboptimal regret bound of $Ω(d^4 \sqrt{T})$ and also relies on computationally intensive calls to the ellipsoid algorithm at each iteration. In this paper, we develop a significantly simpler, computationally efficient algorithm that guarantees $O(d \sqrt{T})$ linear swap regret for a general convex set that has been preconditioned via the John ellipsoid. Our algorithm leverages the powerful response-based approachability framework of Bernstein and Shimkin (JMLR~'15) -- previously overlooked in the line of work on swap regret minimization -- and simultaneously minimizes profile swap regret, which was recently shown to guarantee non-manipulability. Moreover, we establish a matching information-theoretic lower bound: any learner must incur in expectation $Ω(d \sqrt{T})$ linear swap regret for large enough $T$, even when the set is centrally symmetric. This also shows that the classic algorithm of Gordon, Greenwald, and Marks (ICML '08) is existentially optimal for minimizing linear swap regret, although it is computationally inefficient. Finally, we extend our approach to minimize regret with respect to the set of swap deviations with polynomial dimension, unifying and strengthening recent results in equilibrium computation and online learning.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Response-Based Approachability and its Application to Generalized No-Regret Algorithms
Approachability theory, introduced by Blackwell (1956), provides fundamental results on repeated games with vector-valued payoffs, and has been usefully applied since in the theory of learning in games and to learning al…
Rate-Preserving Reductions for Blackwell Approachability
Abernethy et al. (2011) showed that Blackwell approachability and no-regret learning are equivalent, in the sense that any algorithm that solves a specific Blackwell approachability instance can be converted to a subline…
Pseudonorm Approachability and Applications to Regret Minimization
Blackwell's celebrated approachability theory provides a general framework for a variety of learning problems, including regret minimization. However, Blackwell's proof and implicit algorithm measure approachability usin…
Faster Game Solving via Predictive Blackwell Approachability: Connecting Regret Matching and Mirror Descent
Blackwell approachability is a framework for reasoning about repeated games with vector-valued payoffs. We introduce predictive Blackwell approachability, where an estimate of the next payoff vector is given, and the dec…
counterfactualBlackwell Approachability and Gradient Equilibrium are Equivalent
Gradient equilibrium (GEQ) is a recently introduced online optimization framework that generalizes first-order stationarity from offline optimization and abstracts problems like online conformal prediction. While GEQ has…