Systemic Risk Models for Disjoint and Overlapping Groups with Equilibrium Strategies
We analyze the systemic risk for disjoint and overlapping groups (e.g., central clearing counterparties (CCP)) by proposing new models with realistic game features. Specifically, we generalize the systemic risk measure proposed in [F. Biagini, J.-P. Fouque, M. Frittelli, and T. Meyer-Brandis, Finance and Stochastics, 24(2020), 513--564] by allowing individual banks to choose their preferred groups instead of being assigned to certain groups. We introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium for these new models, and analyze the optimal solution under Gaussian distribution of the risk factor. We also provide an explicit solution for the risk allocation of the individual banks, and study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium both theoretically and numerically. The developed numerical algorithm can simulate scenarios of equilibrium, and we apply it to study the bank-CCP structure with real data and show the validity of the proposed model.
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