Testing Information Ordering for Strategic Agents
A key primitive of a strategic environment is the information available to players. Specifying a priori an information structure is often difficult for empirical researchers. We develop a test of information ordering that allows researchers to examine if the true information structure is at least as informative as a proposed baseline. We construct a computationally tractable test statistic by utilizing the notion of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE) to translate the ordering of information structures into an ordering of functions. We apply our test to examine whether hubs provide informational advantages to certain airlines in addition to market power.
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