Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms
This paper experimentally evaluates four mechanisms intended to achieve the Uniform outcome in rationing problems (Sprumont, 1991). Our benchmark is the dominant-strategy, direct-revelation mechanism of the Uniform rule. A strategically equivalent mechanism that provides non-binding feedback during the reporting period greatly improves performance. A sequential revelation mechanism produces modest improvements despite not possessing dominant strategies. A novel, obviously strategy-proof mechanism, devised by Arribillaga et al. (2023), does not improve performance. We characterize each alternative to the direct mechanism, finding general lessons about the advantages of real-time feedback and sequentiality of play as well as the potential shortcomings of an obviously strategy-proof mechanism.
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