The Impossibility of the Almost Pareto Principles
This study proposes a new efficiency requirement, a minimal almost weak Pareto principle, which says that x is socially better than y whenever the only one individual never prefers y to x, and all the others prefers x to y. Then, I show that even if the Pareto principle is modified into this harmless form, that seems sufficiently acceptable in the setting of social choice with variable population sizes or incomplete preferences, it violates acyclicity. Furthermore, it is shown that under this framework, a modified Pareto indifference and usual weak Pareto are inconsistent. These results are serious because they have a wide range of applications, not only to population economics and intergenerational equity analysis, but also to welfare evaluations of incomplete preferences and multi-dimensional well-being. In order to solve these problems, it is necessary to impose very strong assumptions on various contexts of social choice problems.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Automated Search for Impossibility Theorems in Social Choice Theory: Ranking Sets of Objects
We present a method for using standard techniques from satisfiability checking to automatically verify and discover theorems in an area of economic theory known as ranking sets of objects. The key question in this area, …
Decision MakingDecision Making Under UncertaintySocial Welfare Functions with Voters Qualifications: Impossibility Results
We consider the social welfare function a la Arrow, where some voters are not qualified to evaluate some alternatives. Thus, the inputs of the social welfare function are the preferences of voters on the alternatives tha…
AllThe Attribution Impossibility: No Feature Ranking Is Faithful, Stable, and Complete Under Collinearity
No feature ranking can be simultaneously faithful, stable, and complete when features are collinear. For collinear pairs, ranking reduces to a coin flip. We prove this impossibility, quantify it for four model classes, r…
A General Impossibility Theorem on Pareto Efficiency and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents' payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, and monetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social c…
Impossibility in Belief Merging
With the aim of studying social properties of belief merging and having a better understanding of impossibility, we extend in three ways the framework of logic-based merging introduced by Konieczny and Pino P\'erez. Firs…