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The Semi-Random Satisfaction of Voting Axioms

We initiate the work towards a comprehensive picture of the worst average-case satisfaction of voting axioms in semi-random models, to provide a finer and more realistic foundation for comparing voting rules. We adopt the semi-random model and formulation in [Xia 2020], where an adversary chooses arbitrarily correlated ``ground truth'' preferences for the agents, on top of which random noises are added. We focus on characterizing the semi-random satisfaction of two well-studied voting axioms: Condorcet criterion and participation. We prove that for any fixed number of alternatives, when the number of voters $n$ is sufficiently large, the semi-random satisfaction of the Condorcet criterion under a wide range of voting rules is $1$, $1-\exp(-\Theta(n))$, $\Theta(n^{-0.5})$, $ \exp(-\Theta(n))$, or being $\Theta(1)$ and $1-\Theta(1)$ at the same time; and the semi-random satisfaction of participation is $1-\Theta(n^{-0.5})$. Our results address open questions by Berg and Lepelley in 1994, and also confirm the following high-level message: the Condorcet criterion is a bigger concern than participation under realistic models.

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