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The Structure and Incentives of a COVID related Emergency Wage Subsidy

During recent crisis, wage subsidies played a major role in sheltering firms and households from economic shocks. During COVID-19, most workers were affected and many liberal welfare states introduced new temporary wage subsidies to protected workers' earnings and employment (OECD, 2021). New wage subsidies marked a departure from the structure of traditional income support payments and required reform. This paper uses simulated datasets to assess the structure and incentives of the Irish COVID-19 wage subsidy scheme (CWS) under five designs. We use a nowcasting approach to update 2017 microdata, producing a near real time picture of the labour market at the peak of the crisis. Using microsimulation modelling, we assess the impact of different designs on income replacement, work incentives and income inequality. Our findings suggest that pro rata designs support middle earners more and flat rate designs support low earners more. We find evidence for strong work disincentives under all designs, though flat rate designs perform better. Disincentives are primarily driven by generous unemployment payments and work related costs. The impact of design on income inequality depends on the generosity of payments. Earnings related pro rata designs were associated to higher market earnings inequality. The difference in inequality levels falls once benefits, taxes and work related costs are considered. In our discussion, we turn to transaction costs, the rationale for reform and reintegration of CWS. We find some support for the claim that design changes were motivated by political considerations. We suggest that establishing permanent wage subsidies based on sectorial turnover rules could offer enhanced protection to middle-and high-earners and reduce uncertainty, the need for reform, and the risk of politically motivated designs.

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