Utilitarian Theorems and Equivalence of Utility Theories
In this paper, we consider an environment in which the utilitarian theorem for the NM utility function derived by Harsanyi and the utilitarian theorem for Alt's utility function derived by Harvey hold simultaneously, and prove that the NM utility function coincides with Alt's utility function under this setup. This result is so paradoxical that we must presume that at least one of the utilitarian theorems contains a strong assumption. We examine the assumptions one by one and conclude that one of Harsanyi's axioms is strong.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
The Economy's Potential: Duality and Equilibrium
I introduce a concave function of allocations and prices -- the economy's potential -- which measures the difference between utilitarian social welfare and its dual. I show that Walrasian equilibria correspond to roots o…
From Utilitarian to Rawlsian Designs for Algorithmic Fairness
There is a lack of consensus within the literature as to how `fairness' of algorithmic systems can be measured, and different metrics can often be at odds. In this paper, we approach this task by drawing on the ethical f…
FairnessImpartial utilitarianism on infinite utility streams
When evaluating policies that affect future generations, the most commonly used criterion is the discounted utilitarian rule. However, in terms of intergenerational fairness, it is difficult to justify prioritizing the c…
FairnessErgodicity-breaking reveals time optimal decision making in humans
Ergodicity describes an equivalence between the expectation value and the time average of observables. Applied to human behaviour, ergodic theories of decision-making reveal how individuals should tolerate risk in differ…
Decision MakingPractical, Utilitarian Algorithm Configuration
Utilitarian algorithm configuration identifies a parameter setting for a given algorithm that maximizes a user's utility. Utility functions offer a theoretically well-grounded approach to optimizing decision-making under…