Weighted Myerson value for Network games
We study the weighted Myerson value for Network games extending a similar concept for communication situations. Network games, unlike communication situations, treat direct and indirect links among players differently and distinguish their effects in both worth generation and allocation processes. The weighted Myerson value is an allocation rule for Network games that generalizes the Myerson value of Network games. Here, the players are assumed to have some weights measuring their capacity to form links with other players. Two characterization of the weighted Myerson value are provided. Finally, we propose a bidding mechanism to show that the weighted Myerson value is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under a non-cooperative framework.
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