When Does Delegation Beat Majority? A Delegation-Based Aggregator for Multi-Sample LLM Inference
Majority voting is the default unsupervised aggregator for multi-sample LLM inference, but it discards two signals: within-group answer entropy and between-group reasoning geometry. We aggregate by delegation instead (Propagational Proxy Voting, PPV): each group of samples keeps weight on its own answer in proportion to its entropy-based confidence (When) and routes the rest to peers by reasoning-embedding similarity (Whom); the stationary distribution of the resulting delegation matrix picks the consensus answer. This requires neither gold labels nor training. On MMLU-Pro with 128 samples per question, delegation beats majority by +1.5 pp overall and +2.24 pp on non-trivial questions (McNemar p ~ 1.0e-14, n = 8,099), overturning wrong majorities whose answer cluster is geometrically incoherent while the correct minority is tight. We then characterize exactly when delegation overturns majority: a two-option model gives a closed-form flip condition on each option's confidence and the weight it routes to the other, with a do-no-harm corollary for near-unanimous questions. The condition calls the realized winner on 96.5% of non-trivial questions, and its predicted mass gap tracks the realized gap at r = 0.97. We did not find any other unsupervised ensemble methods that close the oracle gap.
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