A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium through $\varepsilon$-Perfect $γ$-Sequential Equilibrium with Local Sequential Rationality and Its Computation
Sequential equilibrium requires a consistent assessment and sequential rationality, where the consistent assessment emerges from a convergent sequence of totally mixed behavioral strategies and associated beliefs. However, the original definition lacks explicit guidance on constructing such convergent sequences. To overcome this difficulty, this paper presents a characterization of sequential equilibrium by introducing $\varepsilon$-perfect $\gamma$-sequential equilibrium with local sequential rationality. For any $\gamma>0$, we establish a perfect $\gamma$-sequential equilibrium as a limit point of a sequence of $\varepsilon_k$-perfect $\gamma$-sequential equilibrium with $\varepsilon_k\to 0$. A sequential equilibrium is then derived from a limit point of a sequence of perfect $\gamma_q$-sequential equilibrium with $\gamma_q\to 0$. This characterization systematizes the construction of convergent sequences and enables the analytical determination of sequential equilibria and the development of a polynomial system serving as a necessary and sufficient condition for $\varepsilon$-perfect $\gamma$-sequential equilibrium. Exploiting the characterization, we develop a differentiable path-following method to compute a sequential equilibrium.
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