Optimally Installing Strict Equilibria
In this work, we develop a reward design framework for installing a desired behavior as a strict equilibrium across standard solution concepts: dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and coarse correlated equilibrium. We also extend our framework to capture the Markov-perfect equivalents of each solution concept. Central to our framework is a comprehensive mathematical characterization of strictly installable, based on the desired solution concept and the behavior's structure. These characterizations lead to efficient iterative algorithms, which we generalize to handle optimization objectives through linear programming. Finally, we explore how our results generalize to bounded rational agents.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Mixed Nash Equilibria in the Adversarial Examples Game
This paper tackles the problem of adversarial examples from a game theoretic point of view. We study the open question of the existence of mixed Nash equilibria in the zero-sum game formed by the attacker and the classif…
Open-Ended Question AnsweringRandomization in Optimal Execution Games
We study optimal execution in markets with transient price impact in a competitive setting with $N$ traders. Motivated by prior negative results on the existence of pure Nash equilibria, we consider randomized strategies…
Offline Learning in Markov Games with General Function Approximation
We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset p…
Multi-agent Reinforcement LearningReinforcement Learning (RL)Optimal Detector Placement in Networked Control Systems under Cyber-attacks with Applications to Power Networks
This paper proposes a game-theoretic method to address the problem of optimal detector placement in a networked control system under cyber-attacks. The networked control system is composed of interconnected agents where …
Nash Equilibria in Greenhouse Gas Offset Credit Markets
One approach to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is to incentivize carbon capturing and carbon reducing projects while simultaneously penalising excess GHG output. In this work, we present a novel market framework…