A Nash Equilibrium Framework For Training-Free Multimodal Step Verification
Multimodal large language models often generate reasoning chains containing subtle errors that lead to incorrect answers. Current verification approaches have notable limitations. Learned critics need extensive labeled data and show inconsistent performance across different tasks. Meanwhile, existing training-free methods simply average scores from different sources, missing a key insight: when these scores disagree, that disagreement itself carries important information about whether a reasoning step is truly valid or not. We propose a training-free verification approach that treats step-wise verification as a coordination problem among specialized judges. We formalize these judges' interaction as a Nash equilibrium game where agreement signals valid steps while disagreement reveals instability. Our method computes equilibrium scores through a closed-form solution, enabling both disagreement-aware filtering and stability-conscious ranking of reasoning steps. Evaluated across six benchmarks, our approach achieves consistent improvements of 2.4% to 5.2% over baseline models and shows competitive performance against learned critics, demonstrating that cross-modal agreement (not just average confidence) provides robust verification signals without task-specific adaptation.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for Crowd Navigation
Robots navigating in crowded areas should negotiate free space with humans rather than fully controlling collision avoidance, as this can lead to freezing behavior. Game theory provides a framework for the robot to reaso…
Collision AvoidanceDecision MakingGaussian ProcessesSocial NavigationApproximate Nash Equilibrium Learning for n-Player Markov Games in Dynamic Pricing
We investigate Nash equilibrium learning in a competitive Markov Game (MG) environment, where multiple agents compete, and multiple Nash equilibria can exist. In particular, for an oligopolistic dynamic pricing environme…
Q-LearningFree-Rider Games for Federated Learning with Selfish Clients in NextG Wireless Networks
This paper presents a game theoretic framework for participation and free-riding in federated learning (FL), and determines the Nash equilibrium strategies when FL is executed over wireless links. To support spectrum sen…
Federated LearningPessimism-Free Offline Learning in General-Sum Games via KL Regularization
Offline multi-agent reinforcement learning in general-sum settings is challenged by the distribution shift between logged datasets and target equilibrium policies. While standard methods rely on manual pessimistic penalt…
Multi-agent Reinforcement LearningBerk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models
We develop an equilibrium framework that relaxes the standard assumption that people have a correctly-specified view of their environment. Each player is characterized by a (possibly misspecified) subjective model, which…