A3M: Adaptive, Adversarial and Multi-Objective Learning for Strategic Bidding in Repeated Auctions
Learning to bid in repeated multi-unit auctions with bandit feedback poses a fundamental challenge. Existing methods often rely on rigid explore-then-exploit schedules, assume stationary adversaries, and optimize solely for bidder utility, thereby limiting adaptability and strategic robustness. To address these limitations, we introduce the A3M framework, which integrates adaptive deep reinforcement learning (DRL), explicit adversarial reasoning, and principled multi-objective reward design for online auction strategy optimization. A3M employs an actor-critic DRL backbone to dynamically balance exploration and exploitation, an opponent model for fictitious play against non-stationary adversaries, and a composite reward function to jointly maximize utility, auctioneer revenue, and fairness. We provide the first comprehensive empirical evaluation of this integrated approach against established baselines in both discriminatory and uniform price auctions. Results show that A3M reduces final regret by 30--40\% in standard settings, maintains robust performance against adversarial strategy shifts, scales favorably with the number of units $K$, and enables tunable multi-objective trade-offs. An extensive ablation study confirms the necessity of each core component. Our work establishes A3M as a powerful and flexible framework for learning in complex auction environments.
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