An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information: a correction
We consider the interim core of normal form cooperative games and exchange economies with incomplete information based on the partition model. We develop a solution concept that we can situate roughly between Wilson's coarse core and Yannelis's private core. We investigate the interim negotiation of contracts and address the two situations of contract delivery: interim and ex post. Our solution differs from Wilson's concept because the measurability of strategies in our solution is postponed until the consumption date (assumed with respect to the information that will be known by the players at the consumption date). For interim consumption, our concept differs from Yannelis's private core because players can negotiate conditional on proper common knowledge events in our solution, which strengthens the interim aspect of the game, as we will illustrate with examples.
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