Analyzing the Impact of Strategic Bidding on the Reserve Capacity via a Bi-Level Model
The growing integration of renewable energy sources necessitates adequate reserve capacity to maintain power balance. However, in market clearing, power companies with flexible resources may submit strategic bids to maximize profits, potentially compromising system reserves. This paper examines the effects of such strategic behavior by modeling the market as a bi-level problem. The upper level represents a strategic company aiming to maximize profit, while the lower level simulates the system operator clearing the market based on submitted offers. To enable duality-based solution methods, we approximate unit commitments with a continuous reserve capacity calculation. Case studies indicate that, in an imperfectly competitive market, more units are incentivized to operate,enhancing system reserves. However, some units go online mainly for profit, ultimately raising electricity costs for consumers. These findings highlight the importance of market design in managing the trade-off between reserve adequacy and economic efficiency in the presence of strategic bidding behavior.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Market Power and Withholding Behavior of Energy Storage Units
Electricity markets are experiencing a rapid increase in energy storage unit participation. Unlike conventional generation resources, quantifying the competitive operation and identifying if a storage unit is exercising …
SchedulingStrategic Bidding in the Frequency-Containment Ancillary Services Market
The vast integration of non-synchronous renewable energy sources compromises power system stability, increasing vulnerability to frequency deviations due to the lack of inertia. Current efforts to decarbonise electricity…
Optimal Participation of Price-maker Battery Energy Storage Systems in Energy and Ancillary Services Markets Considering Degradation Cost
This paper proposes a bi-level optimization framework to investigate the optimal market operation strategies of price-maker battery energy storage systems (BESSs) in real-time energy, spinning reserve, and pay as perform…
Is Online Linear Optimization Sufficient for Strategic Robustness?
We consider bidding in repeated Bayesian first-price auctions. Bidding algorithms that achieve optimal regret have been extensively studied, but their strategic robustness to the seller's manipulation remains relatively …
Computational EfficiencyLeveraging P90 Requirement: Flexible Resources Bidding in Nordic Ancillary Service Markets
The P90 requirement of the Danish transmission system operator, Energinet, incentivizes flexible resources with stochastic power consumption/production baseline to bid in Nordic ancillary service markets with the minimum…