General Manipulability Theorem for a Matching Model
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we proof the General Manipulability Theorem. We result generalizes the presented in Sotomayor (1996 and 2012) for the many-to-one model. In addition, we show General Manipulability Theorem fail when agents' preferences satisfy only substitutability.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Tasks
modelSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, w…
Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability tha…
Manipulation of positional social choice correspondences under incomplete information
We study the manipulability of social choice correspondences in situations where individuals have incomplete information about others' preferences. We propose a general concept of manipulability that depends on the exten…
Aero-Promptness: Drag-Aware Aerodynamic Manipulability for Propeller-driven Vehicles
This work introduces the Drag-Aware Aerodynamic Manipulability (DAAM), a geometric framework for control allocation in redundant multirotors. By equipping the propeller spin-rate space with a Riemannian metric based on t…
M4Diffuser: Multi-View Diffusion Policy with Manipulability-Aware Control for Robust Mobile Manipulation
Mobile manipulation requires the coordinated control of a mobile base and a robotic arm while simultaneously perceiving both global scene context and fine-grained object details. Existing single-view approaches often fai…
Computational Efficiency