Implementations of Cooperative Games Under Non-Cooperative Solution Concepts
Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs to each coalition under some non-cooperative solution concept coincide with their value in the cooperative game, the cooperative game is said to be implementable and the non-cooperative game its implementation. This paper proves that all strictly superadditive partition function form games are implementable under Nash equilibrium and rationalizability; that all weakly superadditive characteristic function form games are implementable under Nash equilibrium; and that all weakly superadditive partition function form games are implementable under trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Discussion then proceeds on the appropriate choice of non-cooperative solution concept for the implementation.
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