Interdependent Scheduling Games
We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins to accrue reward for the player when all predecessor services, which may or may not be controlled by the same player, have been activated. This model, where players have interdependent services, is motivated by the problems faced in planning and coordinating large-scale infrastructures, e.g., restoring electricity and gas to residents after a natural disaster or providing medical care in a crisis when different agencies are responsible for the delivery of staff, equipment, and medicine. We undertake a game-theoretic analysis of this setting and in particular consider the issues of welfare maximization, computing best responses, Nash dynamics, and existence and computation of Nash equilibria.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Tasks
SchedulingSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Computing Nash Equilibria in Generalized Interdependent Security Games
We study the computational complexity of computing Nash equilibria in generalized interdependent-security (IDS) games. Like traditional IDS games, originally introduced by economists and risk-assessment experts Heal and …
Characterization of equilibrium existence and purification in general Bayesian games
This paper studies Bayesian games with general action spaces, correlated types and interdependent payoffs. We introduce the condition of ``decomposable coarser payoff-relevant information'', and show that this condition …
Cyber-physical interdependent restoration scheduling for active distribution network via ad hoc wireless communication
This paper proposes a post-disaster cyber-physical interdependent restoration scheduling (CPIRS) framework for active distribution networks (ADN) where the simultaneous damages on cyber and physical networks are consider…
SchedulingComputing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games (Extended Version)
Leadership games provide a powerful paradigm to model many real-world settings. Most literature focuses on games with a single follower who acts optimistically, breaking ties in favour of the leader. Unfortunately, for r…
Imitation Learning of Correlated Policies in Stackelberg Games
Stackelberg games, widely applied in domains like economics and security, involve asymmetric interactions where a leader's strategy drives follower responses. Accurately modeling these dynamics allows domain experts to o…
Imitation Learning