Learning Nash Equilibrial Hamiltonian for Two-Player Collision-Avoiding Interactions
We consider the problem of learning Nash equilibrial policies for two-player risk-sensitive collision-avoiding interactions. Solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations of such general-sum differential games in real time is an open challenge due to the discontinuity of equilibrium values on the state space. A common solution is to learn a neural network that approximates the equilibrium Hamiltonian for given system states and actions. The learning, however, is usually supervised and requires a large amount of sample equilibrium policies from different initial states in order to mitigate the risks of collisions. This paper claims two contributions towards more data-efficient learning of equilibrium policies: First, instead of computing Hamiltonian through a value network, we show that the equilibrium co-states have simple structures when collision avoidance dominates the agents' loss functions and system dynamics is linear, and therefore are more data-efficient to learn. Second, we introduce theory-driven active learning to guide data sampling, where the acquisition function measures the compliance of the predicted co-states to Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. On an uncontrolled intersection case, the proposed method leads to more generalizable approximation of the equilibrium policies, and in turn, lower collision probabilities, than the state-of-the-art under the same data acquisition budget.
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Active LearningCollision AvoidanceSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
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