Negotiating Networks in Oligopoly Markets for Price-Sensitive Products
We present a novel framework to learn functions that estimate decisions of sellers and buyers simultaneously in an oligopoly market for a price-sensitive product. In this setting, the aim of the seller network is to come up with a price for a given context such that the expected revenue is maximized by considering the buyer's satisfaction as well. On the other hand, the aim of the buyer network is to assign probability of purchase to the offered price to mimic the real world buyers' responses while also showing price sensitivity through its action. In other words, rejecting the unnecessarily high priced products. Similar to generative adversarial networks, this framework corresponds to a minimax two-player game. In our experiments with simulated and real-world transaction data, we compared our framework with the baseline model and demonstrated its potential through proposed evaluation metrics.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for dynamic pricing competition with finite planning horizon
Having fixed capacities, homogeneous products and price sensitive customer purchase decision are primary distinguishing characteristics of numerous revenue management systems. Even with two or three rivals, competition i…
ManagementOn the Oscillations in Cournot Games with Best Response Strategies
In this paper, we consider the dynamic oscillation in the Cournot oligopoly model, which involves multiple firms producing homogeneous products. To explore the oscillation under the updates of best response strategies, w…
Algorithmic Collusion in Dynamic Pricing with Deep Reinforcement Learning
Nowadays, a significant share of the Business-to-Consumer sector is based on online platforms like Amazon and Alibaba and uses Artificial Intelligence for pricing strategies. This has sparked debate on whether pricing al…
Deep Reinforcement LearningQ-Learningreinforcement-learningReinforcement LearningOptimal Execution in Intraday Energy Markets under Hawkes Processes with Transient Impact
This paper investigates optimal execution strategies in intraday energy markets through a mutually exciting Hawkes process model. Calibrated to data from the German intraday electricity market, the model effectively capt…
Regulating Oligopolistic Competition
We consider the problem of how to regulate an oligopoly when firms have private information about their costs. In the environment, consumers make discrete choices over goods, and minimal structure is placed on the manner…