Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule
In the problem of fully allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies efficiency, the equal division guarantee, consistency, and non-obvious manipulability.
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