Off the Rails: Hijacking the Scoring Head in Generative End-to-End Driving Planners with Safety-Violating Adversarial Perturbations
Generative models have recently seen rapid adoption in End-to-End (E2E) autonomous driving (AD), with diffusion-based denoising and vocabulary-based retrieval becoming the dominant trajectory-decoding paradigms. Despite their architectural diversity, current generative AD planners share a common inference pattern: a fixed set of candidate trajectories (anchors, vocabulary entries, or proposal queries) is scored by one or more learned heads conditioned on the Bird's-Eye-View (BEV) features, and the highest-scored candidate is returned as the final trajectory. Under this design, the scoring head is the only barrier between perception and the motion command, and its decision margins between competing candidates are often small. We introduce \textsc{Derail}, an adversarial framework that exploits this scoring-head attack surface. Evaluated on various generative planners, \textsc{Derail} flips the trajectory selection from a safe to an unsafe candidate, with score drops of $39$--$80\%$ and collision rates of up to $50\%$, consistently outperforming generic loss-maximization and feature-divergence attacks. Our analysis suggests that safety-violating objectives govern attack effectiveness against generative AD planners, and that the scoring-head inference pattern itself is a recurring attack surface worth explicit defensive consideration.
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Autonomous DrivingSimilar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
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