홈 › Papers

Physics Breakthrough Disproves Fundamental Assumptions of the Chicago School

Classical law and economics is foundational to the American legal system. Centered at the University of Chicago, its assumptions, most especially that humans act both rationally and selfishly, informs the thinking of legislatures, judges, and government lawyers, and has shaped nearly every aspect of the way commercial transactions are conducted. But what if the Chicago School, as I refer to this line of thinking, is wrong? Alternative approaches such as behavioral law and economics or law and political economy contend that human decisionmaking is based on emotions or should not be regulated as a social geometry of bargains. This Article proposes a different and wholly novel reason that the Chicago School is wrong: a fundamental assumption central to many of its game theory models has been disproven. This Article shows that a 2012 breakthrough from world famous physicist Freeman Dyson shocked the world of game theory. This Article shows that Chicago School game theorists are wrong on their own terms because these 2 x 2 games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Snowdrift, ostensibly based on mutual defection and corrective justice, in fact yield to an insight of pure cooperation. These new game theory solutions can be scaled to design whole institutions and systems that honor the pure cooperation insight, holding out the possibility of cracking large scale social dilemmas like the tragedy of the commons. It demonstrates that, in such systems, pure cooperation is the best answer in the right environment and in the long run. It ends by calling for a new legal field to redesign the structures based on the outdated assumptions of the Chicago School game theorists.

Code (0)

등록된 구현이 없습니다.

Methods 이 논문이 사용한 방법론

Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반