RAS: Measuring LLM Safety Through Refusal Alignment
Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy. Although useful, output-level evaluation is expensive, sensitive to judge choice, and easily tied to fixed question banks. We propose SafeVec, a white-box evaluation procedure that measures safety from internal representations rather than generated answers. SafeVec first extracts layer-wise refusal directions from a safety-aligned reference model, then selects stable layer windows where safe and unsafe behaviors are separable, and finally scores a target model by measuring whether its hidden states align with these refusal directions under unsafe and jailbreak prompts. The resulting metric, RAS (Refusal Alignment Score), maps representation-level refusal alignment to a calibrated 0-100 safety score. Across Llama, Gemma, and Qwen model families, RAS separates aligned models from uncensored and abliterated variants, tracks output-level attack success rate, and is substantially faster than judge-based evaluation. These results suggest that refusal alignment provides a compact and efficient signal for white-box LLM safety evaluation.
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