Slightly Altruistic Nash Equilibrium for Multi-agent Pursuit-Evasion Games With Input Constraints
This is an initial manuscript that presents the basic idea of "slightly altruistic Nash equilibrium", "bi-layer game topology", "rolling horizon target selection". This manuscript is just used for peer discussion and joint Ph.D. application affairs rather than submission to any journal. Thus some references are not all provided. The complete paper for submission will be provided in the next version.
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