Stable Marriage, Children, and Intrahousehold Allocations
We present a revealed preference framework to study sharing of resources in households with children. We explicitly model the impact of the presence of children in the context of stable marriage markets under both potential types of custody arrangement - joint custody and sole custody. Our models deliver testable revealed preference conditions and allow for the identification of intrahousehold allocation of resources. Empirical applications to household data from the Netherlands (joint custody) and Russia (sole custody) show the methods' potential to identify intrahousehold allocation.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Marital Stability With Committed Couples: A Revealed Preference Analysis
We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potent…
Only-child matching penalty in the marriage market
This study explores the marriage matching of only-child individuals and its outcome. Specifically, we analyze two aspects. First, we investigate how marital status (i.e., marriage with an only child, that with a non-only…
Does personality affect the allocation of resources within households?
This paper examines whether personality influences the allocation of resources within households. To do so, I model households as couples who make Pareto-efficient allocations and divide resources according to a distribu…
A mathematical model of human population reproduction through marriage
We develop a linear one-sex dynamical model of human population reproduction through marriage. In our model, we assume that a woman can repeatedly marry and divorce but only married women produce children. The iterative …
An n-ary Constraint for the Stable Marriage Problem
We present an n-ary constraint for the stable marriage problem. This constraint acts between two sets of integer variables where the domains of those variables represent preferences. Our constraint enforces stability and…
ARC