Strategic complementarities as stochastic control under sticky price
We examine how monetary shocks spread throughout an economic model characterized by sticky prices and general equilibrium, where the pricing strategies of firms are interlinked, fostering a mutually beneficial relationship. In this dynamic equilibrium, pricing choices of firms are influenced by overall economic factors, which are themselves affected by these decisions. We approach this situation using a path integral control method, yielding several important insights. We confirm the presence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and scrutinize the impulse response function (IRF) of output subsequent to a shock affecting the entire economy.
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