Systemic risk in interbank networks: disentangling balance sheets and network effects
We study the difference between the level of systemic risk that is empirically measured on an interbank network and the risk that can be deduced from the balance sheets composition of the participating banks. Using generalised DebtRank dynamics, we measure observed systemic risk on e-MID network data (augmented by BankFocus information) and compare it with the expected systemic risk of a null model network, obtained through an appropriate maximum-entropy approach constraining relevant balance sheet variables. We show that the aggregate levels of observed and expected systemic risks are usually compatible but differ significantly during turbulent times (in our case, after the default of Lehman Brothers and the VLTRO implementation by the ECB). At the individual level instead, banks are typically more or less risky than what their balance sheet prescribes due to their position in the network. Our results confirm on one hand that balance sheet information used within a proper maximum-entropy network model provides good aggregate estimates of systemic risk, and on the other hand the importance of knowing the empirical details of the network for conducting precise stress tests on individual banks, especially after systemic events.
Code (0)
등록된 구현이 없습니다.
Similar Papers 제목 키워드 기반
Endogenous distress contagion in a dynamic interbank model: how possible future losses may spell doom today
We introduce a dynamic and stochastic interbank model with an endogenous notion of distress contagion, arising from rational worries about future defaults and ensuing losses. This entails a mark-to-market valuation adjus…
Systemic liquidity contagion in the European interbank market
Systemic liquidity risk, defined by the IMF as "the risk of simultaneous liquidity difficulties at multiple financial institutions", is a key topic in macroprudential policy and financial stress analysis. Specialized mod…
validSystemic Risk Management in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps
We study insolvency cascades in an interbank system when banks are allowed to insure their loans with credit default swaps (CDS) sold by other banks. We show that, by properly shifting financial exposures from one instit…
ManagementA data-driven econo-financial stress-testing framework to estimate the effect of supply chain networks on financial systemic risk
Supply chain disruptions constitute an often underestimated risk for financial stability. As in financial networks, systemic risks in production networks arises when the local failure of one firm impacts the production o…
Large Banks and Systemic Risk: Insights from a Mean-Field Game Model
This paper presents a dynamic game framework to analyze the role of large banks in interbank markets. By extending existing models, we incorporate a large bank as a dynamic decision-maker interacting with multiple small …
Management