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Why do elites extend property rights: unlocking investment and the switch to public goods

This paper presents a new rationale for a self-interested economic elite voluntarily extending property rights. When agents make endogenous investment decisions, there is a commitment problem. Ex-post, the elite face strong incentives to expropriate investments from the non-elite (who don't have property rights), which dissuades investment. Extending property rights to new groups can resolve this problem, even for those not given property rights, by making public good provision more attractive to the elite. Unlike other models of franchise extensions, extending property rights in this paper does not involve the elite ceding control to others. Rather, it changes the incentives they face. Additionally, adding identity groups to the model shows that an elite faces weaker incentives to resolve the commitment problem when it is part of a minority identity -- identity fragmentation makes it harder for a society to extend property rights.

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