CoCo Games: Graphical Game-Theoretic Swarm Control for Communication-Aware Coverage
We propose a novel framework for real-time communication-aware coverage control in networked robot swarms. Our framework unifies the robot dynamics with network-level message-routing to reach consensus on swarm formations in the presence of communication uncertainties by leveraging local information. Specifically, we formulate the communication-aware coverage as a cooperative graphical game, and use variational inference to reach mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the stage games. We experimentally validate the proposed approach in a mobile ad-hoc wireless network scenario using teams of aerial vehicles and terrestrial user equipment (UE) operating over a large geographic region of interest. We show that our approach can provide wireless coverage to stationary and mobile UEs under realistic network conditions.
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